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Abstract 
This housing market matching model considers two types of home seekers: people who 
search for a house both in the rental and in the homeownership market, and people who only 
search in the homeownership market. The house-search process leads to several types of 
matching and in turn this implies different prices of equilibrium. Also, the house-search 
process connects the rental market with the homeownership market. This model is thus able 
to explain both the relationship between the rental price and the selling price and the price 
dispersion which exists in the housing market. Furthermore, this theoretical model can be 
used to study the impact of taxation in the two markets. Precisely, it is straightforward to 
show the effects of two different taxes: the tax on property sale and the tax on rental 
income. 
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1. Introduction 
Although recent, housing market studies that adopt search and matching models are not 
new in the economic literature (notably, Wheaton, 1990; Krainer, 2001; Albrecht et al., 
2007; Caplin and Leahy, 2008; Novy-Marx, 2009; Ngai and Tenreyro, 2009; Diaz and Jerez, 
2009; Albrecht et al., 2009; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; Leung 
and Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 2012). Precisely, two goals are usually pursued: analysing the 
formation process of house price in a decentralised market with search and matching 
frictions; explaining the behaviour of the housing market, in particular the price dispersion 
and the relationship among prices, time-on-the-market and sales. 
The empirical “anomaly” known as ‘price dispersion’ is probably the most important 
distinctive feature of housing markets (see Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). It refers to the 
phenomenon of selling two houses with very similar attributes and in near locations at the 
same time but at very different prices. The literature has mainly responded to the price 
dispersion puzzle by introducing the heterogeneity of economic agents. In Leung and Zhang 
(2011), in fact, a necessary condition for explaining the housing price dispersion (as well as 
the relationship among prices, time-on-the-market and sales) is the heterogeneity on the 
seller's and/or the buyer's side, which generates corresponding submarkets. 
Nevertheless, price dispersion may arise from the very specific nature of the house-
search process. In this model there are in fact two types of home seekers: people who 
search for a dwelling both in the rental and in the homeownership market (named “the 
homeless”), and people who only search in the homeownership market (named “renters or 
tenants”). Hence, the search process leads to several types of matching; in turn, this implies 
different prices of equilibrium. Also, the search process connects the rental market with the 
homeownership market. As far as we are aware, the latter topic has been overlooked by 
housing market studies which adopt search and matching models. Indeed, papers in this 
literature omit the rental housing market from consideration (Diaz and Jerez, 2009) or rely 
on the standard asset-market equilibrium condition (Ngai and Tenreyro, 2009),
1
 thus 
assuming a rental market without frictions (Kashiwagi, 2011).
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1
 Assuming perfectly competitive housing markets, in equilibrium the risk-adjusted returns for homeowners 
and landlords should be equated across investments. This yields the usual user cost formula à la Poterba (1984) 
where the rental price covers the user cost of housing, which is equal to the house price multiplied by the user 
cost, i.e. the sum of the real after-tax interest rate, the combined depreciation and maintenance rate, and the 
expected future house price appreciation. 
2
 Well-functioning rental markets can smooth out fluctuations in housing market liquidity (Krainer, 2001). 
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Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to develop a search and matching model of 
the housing market which is able to explain both the price dispersion and the relationship 
between rental and selling prices, relying only on the different states of home seekers in the 
search process. Furthermore, the proposed theoretical model can be used to study the 
impact of taxation in the housing market. Precisely, we consider the effects of two different 
taxes: the tax on property sale and the tax on rental income. We find that the tax on 
property sale increases the selling price and reduces the rental price; whereas, the tax on 
rental income increases both the rental price and the selling price, thus also increasing the 
time-on-the-market in both markets. Thus, a property sale tax may be better than a rental 
income tax. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the housing market 
matching model; section 3 shows the existence of price dispersion; section 4 describes the 
relationship between selling price and rental price, while section 5 discusses the effects of 
taxation on house prices and time-on-the-market; finally, section 6 closes the model and 
section 7 concludes the work. 
 
2. The model 
The housing market consists of the rental market and the homeownership market. In the 
homeownership market, the home-seeker who finds a dwelling and pays the selling price 
( Sp ) becomes the (new) owner of the house; whereas, this does not happen in the rental 
market, where the rental price ( Rp ) only ensures the use of the house for a certain period of 
time. We distinguish these two markets by the subscript { }SR,i = , where R = rental market 
and S = homeownership market. 
We adopt a standard matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides (see e.g. 
Pissarides, 2000) with random search and prices determined by Nash bargaining. As regards 
the demand side, there are two types of home-seekers in this model: i) the homeless (h) 
who search for a house in both markets simultaneously; ii) the renters or tenants (t) who 
only search in the homeownership market. The value function of the homeless (H ) is the 
following:
3
 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]HpxθgHTθgaerH SSRH −−⋅+−⋅+−−=                                    [1] 
                                                 
3
 Time is continuous and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and discount the future at the exogenous 
interest rate r > 0. As usual in matching-type models, the analysis is restricted to the stationary state. 
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where iθ  is the housing market tightness (see later), with { }SR,i = ; T  is the value of being a 
tenant; He  is the effort (in monetary terms) made by the homeless to find and visit the 
largest possible number of houses; a is the cost of accommodation; ( )iθg  is the 
(instantaneous) probability of finding a vacant house, which depends on iθ , with { }SR,i = ; 
and x is the buyer’s benefit (i.e. the value of the house). Instead, T  is modelled as a staging 
post for searching in the homeownership market: 
( ) [ ] [ ]THδTpxθgperT SSRT −⋅+−−⋅+−−=                        [2] 
where TH ee > , since the homeless search in both markets, and δ is the lease destruction 
rate. A necessary condition for a non trivial equilibrium requires that: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0θgθgδr
paee
HT
SR
RTH >
+++
−+−
=−  
which is true if ( ) RTH paee >+− , namely if the cost of being homeless is higher than the 
cost of being a tenant. 
As regards the supply side, the expected values of posting a vacant house ( iV ) and of 
an occupied dwelling ( iD ), with { }SR,i = , are the following:4 
( ) [ ]RRRRR V-DθqcrV ⋅+−=               [3] 
[ ]RRRR DVδprD −⋅+=                             [4] 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ]ShSSStSSSS Vpβ1θqV-pβθqcrV −⋅−⋅+⋅⋅+−=           [5] 
where cR and cS are, respectively, the cost of posting rental and ownership housing 
vacancies; ( )iθq  is the (instantaneous) probability of filling a vacant house, which depends 
on iθ , with { }SR,i = . In the homeownership market if a contract is legally binding (as 
hypothesised) it is no longer possible to return to the circumstances preceding the bill of 
sale, unless a new and distinct contractual relationship is set up. Hence, there is no 
destruction rate and the value of an occupied home is simply given by the selling price. 
Furthermore, because potential buyers are different, the selling prices are also different: in 
fact, the seller may be matched with either a renter or a homeless person. Hence, β  = t / (t + 
h) and ( )β1 −  = h / (t + h) are, respectively, the share of renters and homeless persons. In 
this model, however, the home-seekers differ only with respect to their state in the search 
process. Furthermore, they can change their condition in the house-search process: in fact, a 
                                                 
4
 The distinction between sellers and landlords is obviously a simplification of the model, since the sellers can 
rent their house and landlords can sell their house. Matters thus become simpler without loss of generality. 
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homeless person can become a renter and vice versa. Hence, we assume that sellers are not 
able to distinguish between different states of buyers, i.e. the buyers always appear identical 
to sellers ex ante.
5
 It also follows that the selling prices appear identical to sellers ex ante, 
i.e. S
h
S
t
S ppp == , and then the equation [5] collapses to: 
( ) [ ]SsSSS V-pθqcrV ⋅+−=                           [6] 
However, when the parties meet each other, the seller will observe the state of buyer ex 
post. Nevertheless, s/he always decides to sell since the search is costly in terms of time and 
money. In a nutshell, if the search is costly and random, it is not convenient for the seller to 
wait for a new match. 
Market frictions in the rental and homeownership market are the following: 
h
v
θ RR =                             [7] 
th
v
θ SS +
=                             [8] 
with ( ) 0θq' i < , and ( ) 0θg' i > , i∀ , since iv  are the vacancies.6 The “zero profit” 
equilibrium condition (i.e. 0Vi = , i∀ ) normally used by matching models gives the market  
equilibrium tensions (see Pissarides, 2000).
7
 However, unlike the labour market matching 
model (which describes a negative relationship between market tightness and wage), in this 
case the free-entry condition yields a positive relationship between market tightness and 
price: 
( ) ( )δrc
p
θq
1
0V
R
R
R
R +⋅
=⇒=                                                   [9] 
( ) S
S
S
S
c
p
θq
1
0V =⇒=                                               [10] 
This positive relationship is very intuitive: in fact, if the price increases, more vacancies will 
be on the market. 
We assume that market tensions are exogenous at the microeconomic level, in the 
sense that each individual takes Rθ  and Sθ  as given in the price bargaining. 
 
                                                 
5
 Alternatively, one can assume that the homeless are ashamed to reveal their status. 
6
 Standard technical assumptions are assumed: 
( ) ( ) ∞==
∞→→ iθi0θ θglimθqlim ii
, and ( ) ( ) 0θqlimθglim iθi0θ ii == ∞→→ , i ∀ . 
7
 By definition, markets with frictions require positive and finite tightness, i.e. ∞<< θ0 , since for 0=θ  the 
vacancies are always filled, whereas for ∞=θ  the home-seekers immediately find a vacant house. 
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3. Surplus, price bargaining and price dispersion 
The generalised Nash bargaining solution, usually used for decentralised markets, allows the 
price to be obtained through the optimal subdivision of surplus deriving from a successful 
match. The surplus is defined as the sum of the seller/landlord’s and home-seeker’s value 
when the trade takes place, net of the respective external options (the value of continuing to 
search). Hence, a trade takes place between the parties at a price determined by Nash 
bargaining if the surplus is positive. Precisely, the price (both rental and selling) solves the 
following optimisation condition: 
( ) ( ){ }γ1γ homeseeker of gain netndlord seller/laof gain netargmaxprice −⋅=                               [11] 
where ( )1 0,γ ∈  is the bargaining power of the seller/landlord. 
Hence, the bargained price crucially depends on the surplus deriving from the 
matching. Precisely, in this model three kinds of matching can occur, thus leading to 
different surpluses: 
1) The homeless person finds a home in the homeownership market. This matching 
produces an equilibrium selling price of  ( ) ( ){ }γ1SγSS1S HpxVpargmaxp −−−⋅−= ; 
2) The renter (tenant) finds a home in the homeownership market. Hence, the equilibrium 
selling price  is ( ) ( ){ }γ1SγSS2S TpxVpargmaxp −−−⋅−= ; 
3) The homeless person finds a home in the rental market. This matching produces an 
equilibrium rental price of ( ) ( ){ }γ1γRRR HTVDargmaxp −−⋅−= . 
Therefore, the existence of price dispersion can be straightforwardly shown. In fact, 
in the homeownership market the net gain of home-seekers is different and this produces 
two different surpluses. Eventually, from equation [11] two different selling prices (
1
Sp  and 
2
Sp ) are obtained. It follows that the origin of price dispersion is due to the specific nature of 
the search and matching process. Indeed, this result holds true even in the presence of an 
identical bargaining power, identical search costs and also when the same house is 
considered. 
 
4. The relation between selling price and rental price 
As regards the selling prices, i.e. the matching 1) and 2) in the homeownership market, 
solving the optimisation conditions yields (recall that in equilibrium i 0,Vi ∀=  ): 
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( ) 1S1S p
γ
γ1
Hpx ⋅
−
=−− ( )Hxγp1S −⋅=⇒  
( ) 2S2S p
γ
γ1
Tpx ⋅
−
=−− ( )Txγp2S −⋅=⇒  
Given the properties of equations [1] and [2], both 
1
Sp  and 
2
Sp  depend positively on Rp  (yet 
remaining different since HT ≠ ): in fact, an increase in the rental price reduces both T  
(directly) and H  (indirectly through T ). Therefore, without loss of generality, we can express 
this relationship in a broader form as follows:
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( )RSS ppp =                           [12] 
with 0p/p RS >∂∂ . Furthermore, if the rental price tends to zero, no one will have 
convenience to buy a house and the value of being a tenant will be at the maximum. As a 
result, the selling price will also tend to zero, since it cannot be negative or null. 
Instead, as regards the matching 3) in the rental market, we obtain: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )RR VD/γγ1HT −⋅−=−  
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) RRR
R
RR pcHT
γ1
θqδrγ
θqδr
cp
γ
γ1
HT =−−⋅
−
++⋅
⇒
++
+
⋅
−
=−⇒  
We know that an increase in selling price reduces both T  and H , since both home-seekers 
search in the homeownership market. Nevertheless, as long as the renter state is an 
appealing perspective, i.e. as long as ( ) δθg R > , the decrease in T  is stronger than the 
decrease in H . Indeed, buying a home is the only future perspective for a tenant. Hence, in 
this case we obtain a negative relationship between rental price and selling price: 
( )SRR ppp =                           [13] 
with 0p/p SR <∂∂ . 
Therefore, the relationship between selling and rental prices can be represented in 
the diagram with axes [ Sp , Rp ], where only a steady-state equilibrium exists in the housing 
market with positive prices (see Figure 1a). 
Eventually, given 
*
Rp  and 
*
Sp , we obtain a unique value of tightness for each market 
(
*
Rθ  and 
*
Sθ ) at the macroeconomic level. This testable proposition is made possible by a 
downward sloping price function (in fact, ceteris paribus, 0θ/p RR <∂∂  and 0θ/p SS <∂∂ ), 
                                                 
8
 Alternatively, one could see pS as a function of the two selling prices (pS
1
, pS
2
) and set up a system of four 
equations in four unknowns (pS, pS
1
, pS
2
, pR). However, this solution would add complexity but no further 
insight. 
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which forms the right hand side (r.h.s.) of the free-entry conditions (see equations [9]-[10] 
and Figure 1b). 
 
a) microeconomic (house prices) 
 
 
b) macroeconomic (housing market tightness) 
Figure 1. Equilibrium 
 
5. Effects of taxation on house prices and time-on-the-market 
By considering rental and homeownership market together in a matching framework, one 
can study how changes in the relative tax treatment of owner and rental housing influence 
the two markets. 
Indeed, the proposed theoretical model can be used to show the effects of both 
property sale tax and rental income tax. Basically, the taxation (τ ) increases the house price, 
since the sellers/landlords react by increasing the price charged to the home-seekers. This 
can be straightforwardly shown by introducing the term iτ− , with { }SR,i = , in the value of 
an occupied home. Precisely, a tax on property sale leads to an increase in selling price and a 
decrease in rental price (see figure 2a); whereas, a tax on rental income leads to an increase 
in both selling and rental prices (see figure 2b). 
The change in house prices, in turn, affects the time it takes to sell (to rent) a 
property, the so-called time-on-the-market (TOM), which measures the degree of illiquidity 
of the real estate market. By using the free-entry conditions, it is straightforward to show 
that the house with a higher price has a longer time-on-the-market. In fact, with a 
probability of filling a vacant house of ( )iθq , the (expected) time-on-the-market is ( ) 1iθq −  
which is increasing in iθ , with { }SR,i = . As a result, with a tax on rental income the time-on-
the-market increases for both markets (since both prices are higher); whereas, with a tax on 
p S 
p R 
∂pS /∂pR > 0 
∂pR /∂pS < 0 
l.h.s. 
r.h.s.
θi 
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property sale the time-on-the-market increases in the homeownership market but decreases 
in the rental market. Therefore, a property sale tax may be better than a rental income tax. 
The tax on property sale is in fact a lump-sum cost for sellers, while the tax on rental income 
is a cost flow for landlords. 
 
a) tax on property sale 
 
b) tax on rental income 
Figure 2. Effects of taxation 
 
6. Closing the model with the homelessness equation 
In order to close the model, we normalise the mass of home-seekers in the housing market 
to the unit: 
ht1 +=                                                                                                                                                 [14] 
The evolution of homelessness in the course of time ( h& ) is the following: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]SR θgθghh1δh +⋅−−⋅=&                                    [15] 
( )h1δ −⋅  represents homelessness inflows, i.e. existing leases cancelled at rate δ , whereas 
( ) ( )[ ]SR θgθgh +⋅  describes the homelessness outflows, i.e. the homeless that find a home 
(as renter or as homeowner). Obviously, the homelessness equation is independent of the 
transition rate which connects the renter (tenant) state to the homeowner state. 
In steady state equilibrium, where homelessness is constant over time ( 0h =& ), it 
follows that: 
( ) ( )SR θgθgδ
δ
h
++
=                                                 [16] 
which has very intuitive properties: ∂h/δ>0, ∂h/∂g(θR)<0, and ∂h/∂g(θS)<0. 
p S 
p R 
∂pS /∂pR > 0 
∂pR /∂pS < 0 
p S 
p R 
∂pS /∂pR > 0 
∂pR /∂pS < 0 
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Eventually, knowing the share of homeless persons, it is straightforward to get the 
share of renters: 
h1t −=                                                                                                                                                 [17] 
since ( ) ( ) 1θgθgδ
δ
0
SR
<
++
< , also the share of renters is positive. Thus, the mass of 
potential home-seekers can never go to zero. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The literature has mainly responded to the price dispersion puzzle by introducing the 
heterogeneity of economic agents. Furthermore, the link between rental and 
homeownership markets has been overlooked by housing market studies which adopt 
search and matching models. This paper develops a search and matching model of the 
housing market which is able to explain both the price dispersion and the relationship 
between rental and selling prices, relying only on the different states of home-seekers in the 
search and matching process. Also, this theoretical model can be useful to study the effects 
of taxation in the housing market. 
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